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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
JONES, II, District Judge. 
Joseph Coniglio (“Coniglio”) appeals guilty verdicts rendered by a jury against 
him on five counts of honest services mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 
1346 (“HSMF Counts”) and one count of extortion under color of official right in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“Extortion Count”).  We will vacate the convictions and 
sentences on the HSMF Counts, affirm the conviction on the Extortion Count, and 
remand for re-sentencing on the Extortion Count. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only the essential facts and 
procedural history of this case.  On February 14, 2008, the United States filed an 
Indictment in this matter that charged Coniglio, a former New Jersey State Senator, with 
eight HSMF Counts and one Extortion Count.  The HSMF Counts charged two objects:  
one sounding in bribery (“the Bribery Object”) and one sounding in concealed conflict of 
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interest (“the Concealed Conflict Object”).  More specifically, the Bribery Object was 
based on allegations that Coniglio entered into a corrupt consulting agreement with the 
Hackensack University Medical Center (“HUMC”) that masked an underlying, unwritten 
agreement to pay Coniglio in exchange for improperly undertaking official actions that 
inured to HUMC‟s financial benefit.  The Concealed Conflict Object was based upon 
allegations that Coniglio improperly concealed material information regarding his 
relationship with HUMC.  Prior to trial, Coniglio moved to dismiss the HSMF Counts to 
the extent that they were based on the Concealed Conflict Object.  The District Court 
denied Coniglio‟s motions and, over the course of the trial, allowed the United States to:  
(1) introduce alleged acts of concealment by Coniglio and HUMC, and (2) argue the 
Concealed Conflict Object was an independent basis upon which the jury could find 
Coniglio guilty of HSMF. 
Trial began on March 25, 2009.  After three weeks, the District Court charged the 
jury.  Over the objection of Coniglio, the District Court instructed the jury that it could 
convict under the HSMF Counts by finding either the Bribery Object or the Concealed 
Conflict Object.  At the same time, however, the District Court declined to charge the jury 
that it had to find either one of the Objects unanimously.  After three days of deliberation, 
the jury returned general verdicts on the HSMF Counts.  In doing so, the jury did not 
specify whether it found Coniglio guilty based on the Bribery Object, the Concealed 
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Conflict Object, or some combination thereof.1 
On April 17, 2009, the jury convicted Coniglio on five HSMF Counts and the 
Extortion Count, acquitted him on two HSMF Counts, and hung on the remaining HSMF 
Count.  The District Court denied Coniglio‟s motions for judgments of acquittal or a new 
trial.  The District Court sentenced Coniglio to thirty months concurrent imprisonment on 
each count of conviction, fined Coniglio $15,000, and entered the final judgment of 
conviction.  Coniglio timely appealed.  This Court stayed his appeal pending the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).  
Having the benefit of that decision and arguments of the parties, we now resolve this 
matter.2 
II. 
On appeal, Coniglio argues that:  (1) in light of Skilling, the District Court erred in 
instructing the jury that it could convict him under the HSMF Counts based on the 
Concealed Conflict Object; (2) his HSMF convictions must be vacated because the error 
concerning the Concealed Conflict Object was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; 
                                                 
1
 The parties disagreed as to the value of a general verdict form versus a verdict form 
containing specific interrogatories concerning the HSMF Bribery Object and Concealed Conflict 
Object.  Coniglio objected to a special verdict form advocated by the Government.  The District 
Court elected to use a general verdict form.  While Coniglio‟s stance may have unfortunately 
contributed to confusion below, it did not constitute a waiver of his right to challenge the HSMF 
Concealed Conflict Object on appeal.  Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2970 (2010). 
  
2
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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and (3) his Extortion Count conviction should be vacated due to “prejudicial spillover” 
from the HSMF Concealed Conflict Object error.  Alternatively, Coniglio contends that 
his convictions should be vacated because the District Court erroneously charged the jury 
in several other respects. 
A. 
In Skilling, the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is unconstitutionally 
vague to the extent it criminalizes behavior beyond bribery and kickback schemes.  
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931.  As a result of Skilling, the Concealed Conflict Object and 
instructions from the District Court based thereon amounted to a “clear and obvious” 
legal error that is “not subject to reasonable dispute.”  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 
312, 323 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).3 
B. 
Having found that Coniglio was charged with, and the jury was instructed upon, 
both a valid and invalid theory of HSMF, we must determine whether the error regarding 
the invalid Concealed Conflict Object was harmless.  Riley, 621 F.3d at 323-25; Skilling, 
130 S. Ct. at 2934 & n.46 (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).  Under 
harmless error review, convictions that may have been based on either a legally valid 
theory or legally invalid theory should be affirmed only if it is clear beyond a reasonable 
                                                 
3
 The United States has acknowledged this conclusion in its briefing and argument. 
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doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty on the valid theory 
absent the invalid theory.  See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999) (“If, at the 
end of that examination, the court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury verdict would have been the same absent the error – for example, where the 
defendant…raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding – it should not find 
the error harmless.”).  See also United States v. Black, 625 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(on remand from U.S. Supreme Court after Skilling, noting that “if it is not open to 
reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would have convicted the[ ] [defendants] of 
pecuniary fraud, the convictions on the fraud counts will stand”). 
Upon careful review of the record below, it is not possible for us to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted Coniglio based 
solely upon the Bribery Object.  At trial, the Government inextricably intertwined 
evidence of bribery and concealment.  The District Court itself specifically charged the 
jury that it might convict Coniglio on either the Bribery Object or the Concealed Conflict 
Object, and the District Court‟s evidentiary rulings throughout the trial may have been 
affected by the existence of the Concealed Conflict Object charges.  Moreover, there is no 
escaping the fact that, while understandably emphasizing the Bribery Object to a greater 
degree, the United States did argue that the Concealed Conflict Object alone was a 
sufficient basis for conviction.  While we do not say it is probable, we do conclude that it 
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is indeed possible that the invalid Concealed Conflict Object could have contributed to 
the verdict.  Stated differently, on the record before us we cannot conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted Coniglio of HSMF absent the 
invalid Concealed Conflict theory.4  Accordingly, the plain error was not harmless and we 
must vacate the HSMF convictions. 
C. 
“Generally, invalidation of the conviction under one count does not lead to 
automatic reversal of the convictions on other counts.”  United States v. Gambone, 314 
F.3d 163, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 897 (3d 
Cir. 1994)).  We are required to analyze whether the Defendant was prejudiced because 
“there was a spillover of evidence from the reversed count that would have been 
inadmissible at a trial limited to the remaining count.”  Riley, 621 F.3d at 325 (quoting 
United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2002)).  “If the answer is „no,‟ then 
our analysis ends, as the reversed count cannot have prejudiced the defendant.”  Id. 
(quoting Cross, 308 F.3d at 318).  Accordingly, here we must decide whether the 
Extortion Count conviction was tainted by evidence admitted on the basis of HSMF 
Concealed Conflict Object Counts, but which would have been excluded in a hypothetical 
                                                 
4 The argument of the United States that the evidence of bribery was “overwhelming” 
does not alone carry the day.  This was a case involving a large amount of sharply contested, 
circumstantial evidence. 
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trial solely on the Extortion Count.  See Riley, 621 F.3d at 325 (citing United States v. 
Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 373-74 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Gambone, 314 F.3d at 181).  Specifically, if most or all of the Government‟s 
concealment evidence would have been admissible in a hypothetical trial only on the 
Extortion Count, Coniglio was not prejudiced and our analysis ends. 
To convict Coniglio on the Extortion Count, the United States was required to 
prove, inter alia, that Coniglio knowingly accepted one or more payments to which he 
was not entitled, “with the implied understanding that he would perform…an act in his 
official capacity.”  United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 257 (3d Cir. 2001).  Moreover, 
based on the charges in the Indictment, the District Court also instructed the jury that it 
had to find Coniglio acted “willfully” – i.e., that Coniglio “knew his conduct was 
unlawful and intended to do something the law forbids,” and “acted with a purpose to 
disobey or disregard the law.”  JA 1024.  Because it can be difficult to prove 
intent/willfulness from direct evidence, consciousness of guilt evidence can be of “high 
probative value to the government‟s case” and admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404.  United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United 
States v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
Here, such evidence included alleged efforts to conceal both:  (1) the relationship 
between HUMC and Coniglio, and (2) particular activities that were allegedly undertaken 
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as part of the purportedly corrupt bargain.  We acknowledge it is possible that, in the 
absence of HSMF charges based on the Concealed Conflict Object, the District Court 
might not have allowed the introduction of every single piece of concealment evidence 
adduced by the United States.  However, we are not persuaded by Appellant‟s contention 
that the vast majority of the Government‟s concealment evidence was solely offered to 
prove the HSMF Concealed Conflict theory, and thus would have been disallowed in a 
trial on only the Extortion Count.  Rather, we are satisfied that the District Court would 
indeed have properly admitted some very significant amount, if not all, of the 
Government‟s concealment evidence in a trial on only the Extortion Count – either as 
evidence of intent or consciousness of guilt.  We further conclude that the District Court 
satisfactorily instructed the jury as to the appropriate use of such evidence.  See JA 1024-
25.  The conviction on the Extortion Count shall therefore be affirmed. 
D. 
Because we will vacate the HSMF convictions, we need not reach Coniglio‟s 
objections to the District Court‟s jury instructions that only pertain to the HSMF Counts.  
Coniglio does make an argument concerning the “stream of benefits” instruction versus 
the “any amount of payment” instruction, and the interrelationship of those instructions 
with the HSMF Counts and the Extortion Count.  It is arguable whether Coniglio 
preserved this objection below as related to the Extortion Count.  See JA 957-59.  
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Nonetheless, we have considered it and we conclude that:  (1) the District Court 
appropriately demarcated its instructions on the Extortion Count from those relating to the 
HSMF Counts, and (2) the District Court‟s Extortion Count instructions were legally 
satisfactory and did not pose a risk of confusion to the jury. 
III. 
We will vacate the District Court Judgment with respect to Counts Two, Three, 
Six, Seven and Eight, we will affirm the judgment of conviction as to Count Nine, and 
remand to the District Court for re-sentencing as to Count Nine. 
